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A CRITIQUE OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S
ANALYSIS OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY
JOINT VENTURE LAW IN ARDITI v. DUBITZKY
AND SAGAMORE CORP. v. DIAMOND WEST
ENERGY CORP.
Robert Steinbuch t
When one party is encumbered with a liability, it will often
look for another party to assume some of the costs. One method
of forcing costs to be shared by another is to have a joint venturer
contribute. Not surprisingly, when a liability arises, the liable party
will be liberal in its interpretation of who among its relationships is
a joint venturer, while a potential contributor will be conservative
in its interpretation. Thus, it is important to identify analytical
tools to determine if a joint venture exists. The first section of this
article discusses the core legal elements of a joint venture and
presents basic techniques for determining its existence. The sec-
ond section discusses the majority view regarding the relationship
between joint ventures and the corporations created to effect their
purposes; the New York and New Jersey exception (the "Excep-
tion") to that view; and the Second Circuit's interpretation of the
Exception. Under the Exception, which can potentially determine
cost allocation, a valid joint venture and attendant liabilities cease
to exist once the joint venture incorporates. The Second Circuit's
interpretation has essentially permitted the rule to consume the
Exception.
I. JOINT VENTURES
A. Definition
Although descriptions ofjoint ventures have varied and courts
have been reluctant to formulate a precise definition of the term,
some common elements in courts' treatment of joint ventures ex-
ist.' "A joint [ ]venture,' as a legal concept, is of comparative[ly]
t J.D., 1992, Columbia Law School; MA., and B.A., 1989, University of Penn-
sylvania. Trial Attorney, United States Department of Justice. Former judicial law
clerk to the Honorable Paul H. Roney of the Eleventh Circuit. The views expressed in
this article are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of
Justice or any other government agency.
1 See generally 2 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF CoNTRAcTs § 318 (3d ed. 1959 & Supp. 1995); Porter v. Cooke, 127 F.2d 853 (5th
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recent origin and is founded entirely on contract, either express or
implied."2 In addition to a contract asserting the creation of ajoint
venture, courts often require that certain elements be present in
the relationship to find that a joint venture exists.3
Although its existence depends on the facts and circumstances
of each particular case, and while no definite rules have been
promulgated which will apply generally to all situations, the de-
cisions are in substantial agreement that the following factors
must be present:
(a) A contribution by the parties of money, property, effort,
knowledge, skill or other asset to a common undertaking;
(b) A joint property interest in the subject matter of the
venture;
(c) A right of mutual control or management of the enterprise;
(d) Expectation of profit, or the presence of "adventure," as it is
sometimes called;
(e) A right to participate in the profits; [and]
(f) Most usually, limitation of the objective to a single undertak-
ing or ad hoc enterprise.4
Accordingly, if disputes arise as to the existence of a joint ven-
ture contract, courts may look to see if any of the additional requi-
sites of a joint venture are present. As a logical matter, the
presence of these typical elements will not satisfy the first require-
ment of the test (i.e., a contract). As a practical matter, however,
Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 670, reh'g denied, 317 U.S. 710 (1942); United States v. Stan-
dard Oil Co., 155 F. Supp. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), affd, 270 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1959);
Harris v. Morse, 54 F.2d 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
2 WILLISTON & JAEGER, supra note 1, § 318, at 553 (quoting Rockett v. Ford, 326
P.2d 787 (Okla. 1940)). See Porter, 127 F.2d at 858; United States v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1461, 1469 (D. Del. 1990) ("one appellate court has stated a
prerequisite to finding a joint venture is a 'willingness to be joint venturers, share
control, and [a] division of profits and losses"' (citing Edward Hines Lumber Co. v.
Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 158 (7th Cir. 1988))); Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Com-
modities Bagging & Shipping Process Supply Co., 611 F. Supp. 665, 679 (D.NJ. 1988);
Standard Oi4 155 F. Supp. at 148; Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press Mfg. Co.,
128 P.2d 665, 673 (Cal. 1942) ("Whether the parties to a particular contract have
thereby created, as between themselves, the strict relation of joint adventurers or
some other relation involving cooperative effort, depends upon their actual intention,
which is determined in accordance with the ordinary rules governing the interpreta-
tion and construction of contracts.").
3 WILLISTON &JAEGER, supra note 1, § 318A, at 556.
4 WILLISTON & JAEGER, supra note 1, § 318A, at 563-65 (citations omitted). See
Hellenic Lines, 611 F. Supp. at 679; see also Consolidated Rail, 729 F. Supp. at 1469; Shell
Oil Co. v. Prestidge, 249 F.2d 413, 415-16 (9th Cir. 1957); George D. Horning v.
McAleenan, 149 F.2d 561, 566 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 761 (1945); Consoli-
dated Fisheries Co. v. Consolidated Solubles Co., 112 A.2d 30, 35, reh'g denied, 113
A.2d 576 (Del. 1955); Albert Packing Corp. v. Ficking Properties, 200 So. 907, 908
(Fla. 1941).
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their presence allows courts to infer the existence of the joint ven-
ture contract. This "leap of faith" or "argument from existence"
analysis, however, does not state that the essential elements prove
the agreement, but simply implies that since the elements are
there, the agreement must exist despite the fact that there is no
independent evidence to support it. This distinction is of little
comfort to practitioners who are less concerned about a court's
reasoning than about its conclusion.
B. Ancillary Tools
The statute of frauds and tax laws could aid in determining
whether or not ajoint venture was formed. Simply looking for the
actual written joint venture contract or examining parties' tax re-
turns could provide the added evidence necessary to determine if a
joint venture exists.
It is a fundamental principle of contract law that when both
sides reach an agreement as to the terms of a deal, they are bound
regardless of whether the agreement is oral or written.' However,
due to the many difficulties of enforcing oral agreements, most ju-
risdictions in the United States have enacted a statute of frauds,
which requires that certain types of agreements be in writing in
order to be enforceable. 6 These include, inter alia, contracts for
5 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1981) ("A promise may be stated in
words either oral or written, or may be inferred wholly or partly from conduct.").
6 See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 7-2-201, 8-9-1 (1993); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-101
(West 1994); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624 (West 1985 & Supp. 1996); COLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 38-10-101, -106 (West 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-550 (West 1991 &
Supp. 1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 1-206, 2-201, 8-319 (1993); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 28-3501 (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.01 (West 1994), § 725.01 (West 1988); GA.
CODE ANN. § 13-5-30 (1982 & Supp. 1995); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/1, 80/2 (West
1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.32 (West 1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 33-101 (1986); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 355.2-201 (Michie 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1-206, 2-
201, 8-319 (West 1995), tit. 33, § 51 (West 1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, §§ 1-
206, 2-201, 8-319 (West 1990), ch. 259, § 1, ch. 260, § 13 (West 1992); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 513.01, 513.03 (West 1990); Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-3-1 (1995); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 432.010 (West 1992); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-103, 36-107, 36-202 (Michie 1993);
NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.205, 111.210, 111.220, 111.235 (Michie 1993); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 382-A:1-206, 382-A:2-201, 382-A:8-319 (1994); N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 12A:1-
206, 12A:2-201, 12A:8-319 (1962), § 25:1-1 (1940 & Supp. 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 46-2-13 (Michie 1989); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-701 (Consol. Supp. 1996); N.Y.
U.C.C. LAw §§ 1-206, 2-201 (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1996), § 8-319 (McKinney
1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 22-1, 22-4 (1986); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-06-04 (Supp. 1995),
§ 47-10-01 (1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1301.12, 1302.04, 1335.01, 1335.04-.05
(Banks-Baldwin 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 136, 324-325, tit. 16, § 4 (West
1991); 33 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1 (West 1967); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 6A-1-206, 6A-2-201,
6A-8-319 (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 32-3-10, 32-3-20 (Law Co-op. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED
LAws § 43-32-5 (Allen Smith 1983), § 53-8-2 (Michie 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-2-
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the sale of land, agreements that will not be fully performed within
one year, promises to answer for the debt of another, agreements
modifying written contracts, contracts for the sale of goods in ex-
cess of $500, contracts for the sale of personal property in excess of
$5,000, and contracts for the sale of securities.7
If a contract falls within ajurisdiction's statute of frauds, it will
usually only be enforceable if the agreement is in writing and the
writing specifies the parties and subject matter of the contract.'
Accordingly, if the alleged joint venture falls within the scope of
the statute of frauds, the absence of a written agreement could be
evidence that ajoint venture does not exist. However, this analysis
is of limited usefulness because of the lack of clarity as to the appli-
cability of the statute of frauds tojoint venture agreements.9 More-
over, the statute of frauds can also be satisfied by partial
performance. ' ° Thus, if a court finds evidence that the parties
were acting as if they were bound by an agreement that would nor-
mally require a writing under the statute of frauds, the court may
choose to enforce the agreement even absent a writing. For exam-
ple, if an oral contract for the sale of goods worth $10,000 requires
ten installment payments, two or three payments could constitute
101 (Supp. 1995); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26-01 (West 1987); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 25-5-1, 25-5-9 (1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, §§ 1-206, 2-201, 8-319 (1994), tit.
12, § 181 (1973 & Supp. 1995), §§ 182-183 (1973); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-1, -2 (Michie
1993), §§ 55-2, -3 (Michie 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.52.010 (West 1995),
§ 19.36.010 (West 1989), § 62A.1-206 (West Supp. 1996), § 62A.2-201 (West 1995),
§ 62A.8-113 (West Supp. 1996), § 64.04.010 (West 1994); W. VA. CODE § 36-1-1
(1985), § 48-3-9 (1995), § 55-1-1 (1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 240.10 (West Supp. 1995),
§ 241.02 (West 1987), § 241.025 (West Supp. 1995), § 241.09 (West 1987),
§§ 401.206, 402.201, 408.319 (West 1995), § 704.03 (West 1981); Wvo. STAT. ANN.
§ 34.1-3-119 (Michie 1996).
7 N.J. REv. STAT. § 25:1-5 (1940 & Supp. 1996); N.Y. GEN. OBuG. LAw § 5-701
(Consol. Supp. 1996). See, e.g., Inter-City Tire & Auto Center, Inc. v. Uniroyal, Inc.,
701 F. Supp. 1120, 1125 (D.NJ. 1988), aff'd, 888 F.2d 1380 (3d Cir. 1989), aff'd sub
nom. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Erbesh, 888 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir. 1989); Kahn v. Massler, 140 F.
Supp. 629, 643 (D.NJ. 1956), aff'd, 241 F.2d 47 (3d Cir. 1957).
8 See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 25:1-5 (1940 & Supp. 1996); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-
701 (Consol. Supp. 1996).
9 Compare Sugar Creek Stores, Inc. v. Pitts, 604 N.Y.S.2d 407, 408 (N.Y. App. Div.
1993) ("While an oral agreement may be sufficient to create a joint venture relation-
ship, the Statute of Frauds applies to joint ventures, which, as here, have a stated term
of more than one year." (citations omitted)) with Blank v. Nadler, 533 N.Y.S.2d 891,
892 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) ("It is well [-] settled that an oral agreement may be suffi-
cient to create a joint-venture relationship and that the Statute of Frauds is generally
inapplicable thereto." (citations omitted)).
10 See Banker's Trust Co. v. Steenburn, 409 N.Y.S.2d 51, 61-62 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978),
affid, 418 N.Y.S.2d 723 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
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partial performance, and the court may enforce the contract.11
Additionally, joint ventures sound in partnership law and,
thus, similar rules apply to both relationships when determining
respective parties' obligations.12 Federal tax law deems ajoint ven-
ture equivalent to a partnership and requires joint ventures to pay
taxes as if they were partnerships." Thus, an examination of the
parties' filings should provide evidence as to whether the partici-
pants intended to be joint venturers.
II. JOINT VENTURES AS CORPORATIONS
Whether the persons deciding to create an organization to ef-
fectuate a joint enterprise (the "organizing parties") properly fol-
low the procedures of incorporation, and do in fact form a
corporation, will not in itself determine the permanence of the
joint venture. 4 The permanence will depend initially on whether
the jurisdiction allows joint ventures to take the form of a corpora-
tion. If it does not, then the joint venture gives way to the corpo-
rate form and no confidential fiduciary duty exists among the
shareholders.15 Consequently, liability among the organizing par-
ties is limited, and equitable claims, such as those for an account-
ing, cannot be brought by one of the former joint venturers
(presently shareholders) against any of the others. If, however, the
jurisdiction allows ajoint venture to take the form of a corporation,
11 See Ebker v. Tan Jay Int'l, Ltd., 739 F.2d 812, 828 (2d Cir. 1984), affid, 930 F.2d
909 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 853, reh'g denied, 502 U.S. 1000 (1991).
12 WILLISTON & JAEGER, supra note 1, §§ 318, 318B, at 550-52, 585-616; Walter v.
Holiday Inns, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 1159, 1167 n.10 (D.N.J. 1992), affd, 985 F.2d 1232
(3d Cir. 1993); Roberts v. Craig, 268 P.2d 500, 504 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954); Lesser v.
Smith, 160 A. 302, 304 (Conn. 1932); Ross v. Willett, 27 N.Y.S. 785, 786 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1894).
13 WILLISTON & JAEGER, supra note 1, § 318B, at 585. See Stuart v. Willis, 244 F.2d
925, 928 (9th Cir. 1957) ("Ajoint venture as defined by the Internal Revenue Code is
a partnership '** * [sic] through or by means of which any business, financial opera-
tion, or venture is carried, and which is not, within the meaning of this tide, a trust or
estate or corporation."' (citation omitted)); Boone v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 115,
120 (D.N.D. 1973).
14 The organizing parties can be real persons or legal persons, i.e., corporations.
Corporations are generally empowered to form partnerships or joint ventures with
other corporations. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-1(m) (West 1969); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 202(a) (15) (McKinney 1986). Of course, the fact that corporations can
become members of partnerships does not make the aggregation of the partners itself
a corporation. The issue here is whether an arrangement between two or more per-
sons or corporations, or any combination thereof, can itself take the form of a corpo-
ration, yet remain a joint venture with all of the attendant responsibilities and
liabilities.
15 See, e.g., Weisman v. Awnair Corp. of America, 144 N.E.2d 415, 418 (N.Y. 1957).
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then the court must determine whether the organizing parties in-
tended the joint venture to continue even after the enterprise in
question was incorporated. 16 In this regard, the interposition of a
corporation will not negate the existence of ajoint venture, "[b]ut
it is an important consideration in that direction and will be con-
clusive in the absence of compelling factors to the contrary. " " If
the jurisdiction allows joint ventures to take the form of a corpora-
tion, and both thejoint venture and the corporation are valid, then
the parties to the joint venture shall be liable to each other asjoint
venturers, while the incorporated venture shall have limited liabil-
ity as to third parties." Indeed, the majority view is that, while a
partnership may not take the form of a corporation, ajoint venture
may. In these jurisdictions, individuals or corporations can form a
corporation as a joint venture, resulting in limited liability as to
third parties but not as between themselves. 9 Thus, whether the
jurisdiction allows joint ventures to take the corporate form is criti-
cal. It will determine the type of liability that the relevant parties
face.
A. The New York and New Jersey Exception
A minority of jurisdictions refuse to recognize as valid a joint
venture in the form of a corporation.2 ° In Weisman v. Awnair Corp.
of America,2 1 the New York Court of Appeals held that "the rule is
well [-] settled that ajoint venture may not be carried on by individ-
uals through a corporate form. '22 In its decision, the Weisman
court relied on the New Jersey state case of Jackson v. Hooper.2 In
Jackson, the court held that it would violate public policy to allow a
corporation to maintain the corporate veil against the public, but
not allow its shareholders the same protection for disputes among
16 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 155 F. Supp. 121, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), affd,
270 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1959).
17 Id.
18 WILLISTON & JAEGER, supra note 1, § 318C, at 619.
19 WILISTON & JAEGER, supra note 1, § 318C, at 619. See Enos v. Picacho Gold
Mining Co., 133 P.2d 663, 667 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1943); Hathaway v. Porter Royalty
Pool, Inc., 295 N.W. 571, 577-78, amended by 299 N.W. 451 (Mich. 1941).
20 WILLISTON &JAEGER, supra note 1, § 318C, at 619.
21 144 N.E.2d 415 (N.Y. 1957).
22 Id. at 418. See Yonofsky v. Wernick, 362 F. Supp. 1005, 1022 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
("When joint adventurers carry on their business through a corporate entity[,] they
cease being joint adventurers and assume the rights, duties and obligations of stock-
holders." (citing Weisman, 144 N.E.2d at 449)); Noto v. Cia Secula di Armanento, 310
F. Supp. 639, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Bevilacque v. Ford Motor Co., 509 N.Y.S.2d 595,
599 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
23 75 A. 568 (NJ. 1910).
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themselves.2 4 Thus, these courts hold that once ajoint venture in-
corporates, thejoint venture ceases to exist and the parties become
only shareholders. They are no longer fiduciaries to each other
and no longer personally liable. A result is that the very powerful
equitable relief available to partners and joint venturers, receipt of
an accounting, is not available to the organizing parties.
B. The Second Circuit's View
The Second Circuit's interpretation of the Exception severely
limits the force of Weisman. In Arditi v. Dubitzky,25 the Second Cir-
cuit stated that the laws of New York and New Jersey are for all
practical purposes identical with regard to joint ventures. 26 The
court, restricting Weisman and Jackson, held that joint venture obli-
gations can exist among members of a corporation if it is the inten-
tion of the parties that the corporation simply be a means of
carrying out thejoint venture.27 Since Arditi is the Second Circuit's
interpretation, it is persuasive but not binding on either of these
state courts. More importantly, the Arditi court relied on cases not
strongly supportive of its viewpoint. In fact, the Arditi court cited
the New York and New Jersey state court cases of Macklem v. Marine
Park Homes, Inc.,28 M.P.E. Holding Corp. v. Freeman's Dairy, Inc.,29
Loverdos v. Vomvouras,3 ° and Fortugno v. Hudson Manure Co.
31 to sup-
port its proposition that the Weisman/Jackson line has been
restricted.
Macklem was decided at the trial level in 1955 before the Weis-
man opinion was issued, and affirmed in 1960 after Weisman was
decided. To support its proposition that Macklem is distinguished
from Weisman, the Arditi court cited the unattributed quote that
the corporation was "merely * * [sic] an adjunct of a joint ven-
ture."32 This quote, however, does not appear in the Macklem opin-
ion. The trial court in Macklem concluded that the parties did not
intend to carry on the venture as stockholders in a corporation. 3
24 Id. at 571. See WILLISTON &JAEGER, supra note 1, § 318C, at 619-20; Ault & Wi-
borg of Canada v. Carson Carbon Co., 160 So. 298, 300 (La. 1935).
25 354 F.2d 483 (2d Cir. 1965).
26 Id. at 485.
27 Id. at 487.
28 191 N.Y.S.2d 374 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955), affd mem., 191 N.Y.S.2d 545 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1959), appeal dismissed, 165 N.E.2d 201 (N.Y.), affd, 170 N.E.2d 455 (N.Y. 1960).
29 232 N.Y.S.2d 639 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962).
30 200 N.Y.S.2d 921 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960).
31 144 A.2d 207 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1958).
32 Arditi v. Dubitzky, 354 F.2d 483, 486 (2d Cir. 1965).
33 Macklem, 191 N.Y.S.2d at 376.
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Further, the court held that "[i] t is very likely, under the facts as
developed at the trial, that were this an action brought by a credi-
tor of [the parties to the joint venture] the 'corporate veil' would
be 'pierced.'"3 4 It also held that "[t]he incorporators were 'dum-
mies' and apparently no corporate meetings were held and no
stock issued,""5 and that the party seeking a distribution of stock
was prohibited by state law from receiving stock for his services.36
Although Macklem may provide support for the Arditi opinion, the
irregularities with the corporation in question seem to have been
critical to the court's analysis. As a result, the applicability of
Macklem to cases involving valid corporations is dubious.
M.P.E. Holding Corp. and Loverdos clearly support Weisman, de-
spite the Arditi court's reliance on them. Conversely, Fortugno pro-
vides some support, albeit limited, for Arditi. The Fortugno court,
using equity, despite the "lack of precedent," held that the "part-
nership's stock ownership was not for the purpose of participating
in corporate affairs in the normal manner, but was resorted to in
order to simply make each corporation an instrumentality or de-
partment of the integrated family enterprise."" The Arditi court
claimed to be following precedent when it cited Fortugno.3 s Ironi-
cally, the Fortugno court disavowed the existence of any precedent
on the issue.
3 9
The Second Circuit further demonstrated how overreliance
on, and the misapplication of, precedent can be detrimental in
Sagamore Corp. v. Diamond West Energy Corp.4" Therein, the court
again relied on unsupportive case law. The court indicated that
almost as soon as the ink was dry on the Weisman opinion, the New
York courts began to retreat from the rule laid out therein.4 1 The
parties in Sagamore validly formed a joint venture and then formed
a corporation to effect the venture.42 The court held that the rule
in New York under such circumstances is that when parties to a
joint venture merge the entire joint venture agreement into the
corporation, the enterprise is governed by corporation law.43 How-
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Fortugno v. Hudson Manure Co., 144 A.2d 207, 217 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1958).
38 Arditi v. Dubitzky, 354 F.2d 483, 485 (2d Cir. 1965).
39 Fortugno, 144 A.2d at 217.
40 806 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1986).
41 Id. at 378.
42 Id. at 374, 376.
43 Id. at 378.
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ever, when parties to a joint venture form a corporation to carry
out one or more of the joint venture's objectives and intend the
joint venture to exist along with the corporation, the rights and
duties under the joint venture agreement still exist.4 4 Like Arditi,
the Sagamore rule is bifurcated. It allows joint venture obligations
to exist after incorporation in some situations, but not others.
However, the Sagamore rule appears more constrained than the one
set out in Arditi. The Sagamore court seems only to allow the inter-
vention of a corporation into a joint venture if the corporation has
a limited focus.
As in Arditi, the case law cited by the Sagamore court does not
strongly support its holding. The Sagamore court relied on Ardit4 5
and Macklem,46 on four cases that held that a joint venture no
longer exists when it is merged into the ensuing corporation,4 7 and
on two cases that the court contended demonstrate that ajoint ven-
ture and corporation can exist simultaneously.
48
The reliance by the Sagamore court on the above four cases as
support for the claim that there is a bifurcated standard under New
York law was misplaced. Two of these cases rest squarely on Weis-
man, which mandates the Exception and, therefore, does not allow
for the bifurcated rule.49 Under Weisman, joint venture obligations
simply do not exist after incorporation. 50 Of course, Weisman sup-
ports the half of the bifurcated rule preventing joint venture liabil-
ity after incorporation, but Weisman swallows and prevents the
exemption Sagamore tries to develop. It is one thing for the Saga-
more court to simply state that Weisman goes too far, and then re-
strict the Weisman holding. It is wholly different to claim that
Weisman's progeny have limited Weisman, when they clearly have
not. Miglietta v. Kennecott Copper Corp.51 and Farber v. Romano,52 also
cited in the Sagamore opinion, rest their decisions upon Manacher v.
44 Id.
45 Sagamore, 806 F.2d at 378.
46 Id.
47 Id. (citing Beck v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 469 N.Y.S.2d 785 (N.Y. App. Div.
1983), appeal dismissed, 469 N.E.2d 102 (N.Y. 1984); Judelson v. Weintraub,
390 N.Y.S.2d 455 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977); Miglietta v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 266
N.Y.S.2d 936 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966); Farber v. Romano, 232 N.Y.S.2d 285 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1962)).
48 Id. at 378-79 (citing Triggs v. Triggs, 385 N.E.2d 1254 (N.Y. 1978); Shapolsky v.
Shapolsky, 279 N.Y.S.2d 747 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966), affd, 282 N.Y.S.2d 163 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1967)).
49 See Beck, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 786; Judelson, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 456.
50 See Beck, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 786; Judelson, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 456.
51 266 N.Y.S.2d 936 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966).
52 232 N.Y.S.2d 285 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962).
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Central Coal Co.53 Manacher, relying on Jackson, concluded that a
joint venture agreement can run
[A]long side of the path of the corporation[, but] [w]hen the
two merge . . . and relief is sought upon the ground that the
corporation has become a mere agency or instrumentality for
the performance of an independent agreement of joint adven-
turers or partners[,] the aggrieved party is relegated to his rights
as a stockholder and may not sue in his individual capacity.54
The Manacher court aptly summed up its decision as follows:
"Individuals may enter into partnership agreements or joint ven-
tures independent of the corporate form but they may not organ-
ize a corporation for the purpose of carrying on ajoint venture."55
Thus, Manacher only appears to have provided for a qualification to
the Exception in limited situations where ajoint venture has organ-
ized a corporation to effect one part of a multifaceted joint
venture.
Finally, the Sagamore court relied on Arditi, Triggs v. Triggs,
56
Shapolsky v. Shapolsky 7 and Fromkin v. Merrall Realty, Inc.,58 to sup-
port the proposition that parties to a joint venture, in forming a
corporation to carry out one or more of its objectives, may reserve
certain rights inter sese under their agreement.
59
As with previously discussed cases, Fromkin rests upon and sup-
ports Weisman.6" Triggs does not involve ajoint venture, but simply
deals with an agreement between corporate shareholders regard-
ing a stock purchase option.61 Shapolsky involves a unique factual
situation that seems to have dictated the outcome. In that case,
plaintiff and his brother, the defendant, agreed to purchase real
estate for speculation and to take title to such in the name of sev-
eral corporations.6" Plaintiff contended that his brother never
gave him stock certificates in the aforementioned corporations.63
The court merely held that this was not a derivative action, and
53 131 N.Y.S.2d 671 (N.Y. App. Div. 1954), affd, 125 N.E.2d 431 (N.Y. 1955).
54 Id. at 676.
55 Id. at 677.
56 385 N.E.2d 1254 (N.Y. 1978).
57 279 N.Y.S.2d 747 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966), affd, 282 N.Y.S.2d 163 (N.Y. App. Div.
1967).
58 225 N.Y.S.2d 632 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal denied, 183 N.E.2d 770 (N.Y. 1962).
59 Sagamore Corp. v. Diamond West Energy Corp., 806 F.2d 373, 378-79 (2d Cir.
1986).
60 Fromkin, 225 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
61 Triggs, 385 N.E.2d at 1254.
62 Shapolsky, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
63 Id. at 749-50.
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plaintiff could maintain an action against his brother for the stock
certificates, as plaintiffs right to recovery had its origin independ-
ent of and extrinsic to the corporate entity.64
Finally, in a recent federal district court case in New York, Zahr
v. Wingate,65 the court explicitly followed Weisman and its progeny.
Zahr, however, did not specifically address Arditi and Sagamore.
Therefore, we cannot be sure whether the court, in properly fol-
lowing New York precedent, recognized its departure from the Sec-
ond Circuit's view of the law.
III. CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit should follow Zahr and its proper adher-
ence to New York law. Weisman created the Exception whereby
joint ventures could not incorporate, but the Second Circuit weak-
ened the Exception to the point of virtual elimination. Like any
United States Court of Appeals reviewing a district court's interpre-
tation of state law, the Second Circuit is in a delicate position
thrust upon it by the principles of federalism embodied in the Con-
stitution. Such a court must take pains to interpret the state law as
the state court would. If the court is unsure of the state law or the
state has not addressed a particular issue, the court can certify a
question for state court review. Rewriting the state law, however, is
inappropriate. This, though, is exactly what the Second Circuit has
done. The Second Circuit should revisit the issue and revitalize
Weisman.
64 Id. at 751.
65 827 F. Supp. 1061, 1068-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("It is axiomatic that individuals may
not, as a matter of law, operate a business entity as a partnership for the purposes of
defining their rights vis-a-vis each other while concurrently holding the entity out to
the general public as a corporation." (citing Weisman v. Awnair Corp. of America, 144
N.E.2d 415, 418 (N.Y. 1957) and Jackson v. Hooper, 75 A. 568, 571 (N.J. 1910))).
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